























When is the brain ready for mental actions? 
Readiness potential for mental calculations
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While the preparatory neural mechanisms of real and imagined body movements have been extensively studied, the underpinnings of 
self‑initiated, voluntary mental acts are largely unknown. Therefore, using electroencephalography (EEG), we studied the time course 
and patterns of changes in brain activity associated with purely mental processes which start on their own, without an external or 
interoceptive stimulation. We compared EEG recordings for decisions to perform mental operations on numbers, imagined finger 
movements, and actual finger movements. In all three cases, we found striking similarities in slow negative shifts of brain electrical 
activity lasting around 1 s and, therefore, characteristic for readiness potential. These results show that the brain not only needs time to 
be ready for a purely mental task but also that a required preparatory interval involves neural changes analogical to the ones observed 
before intentional body movements. As such, the readiness potential represents a universal process of unconscious preparatory brain 
activity preceding any, including purely mental, voluntary action.
Key words: volition, mental actions, readiness potential, mathematical ability, Libet’s experiment
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a skillful crossword puzzle 
solver and have just bought your favorite new brain 
teaser. You start reading the clues and stop by one 
which seems easy to answer. It does not mean that the 
correct word simply pops up in your mind. You must 
perform a sequence of operations: find candidates for 
a solution, examine them carefully and select the one 
which best fits the meaning expressed in the clue. Af‑
ter solving this task, you choose the next clue and en‑
gage in further mental efforts until all the blanks are 
filled in. Assuming that every process of selecting the 
clue and finding a solution was freely initiated and 
performed without any external support from friends, 
books, or electronic devices, one could say that it is 
a paradigmatic example of an important kind of a cog‑
nitive task. Its aim is not to find out what is happening 
in the immediate surroundings but to set the mind in 
motion to produce a purely mental result. This find‑
ing can later be expressed verbally but then it is only 
an announcement of a previous solution. Such an an‑
nouncement is completely different from, for example, 
an “intention to move” because the effect of the latter 
is a real or imagined movement (expressed either as co‑
vert or overt bodily change), not a purely mental result. 
There are many examples of these kinds of mental 
exercises, including the classic ones, such as mathe‑
matical calculations performed without any external 
supports. Could such mental acts be studied from an 
outside, non‑egocentric perspective? To address this 
question, we focused on the brain’s electrical activ‑
ity associated with the initiation of digit addition as 
a purely voluntary mental act. 
The most commonly studied voluntary motor actions 
so far are typically preceded by specific brain activity 
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called readiness potential (RP). Although RP was identi‑
fied in the 1960s (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Deecke et 
al., 1969), nearly 20 years passed until Libet and collab‑
orators (1983, 1985) demonstrated that it occurs before 
a conscious decision to move a body part. From then on 
(Lang, 2003; Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006), the concept of 
RP was used to refer solely to preparatory neural activity 
in the cerebral motor system. Indeed, philosophers and 
neuroscientists have typically associated this phenom‑
enon exclusively with motor acts. Likewise, the issue of 
volitionality was previously studied only in the context 
of overt behavior (Brass et al., 2013). Yet, later studies 
suggest that contributions from motor‑related process‑
es may not be necessary for RP generation (Alexander 
et al., 2016), or may be associated mainly with action 
consequences or outcomes, not the movement itself (Jo 
et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2018). For example, when a re‑
sponse is prepared and then abandoned (as in a NoGo 
condition), it is still preceded by RP (Alexander et al., 
2016). Interestingly, when a prepared response is always 
followed by the associated non‑motoric effect, the gen‑
erated RP can be even greater (Wen et al., 2018). 
Capitalizing on these findings, we hypothesized that 
RP is in fact a more general neural mechanism of getting 
ready to act. Thus, a volitional action could be of a phys‑
ical as well as mental kind. If this hypothesis holds, then 
RP should be registered even before a voluntary initia‑
tion of purely mental actions; skilled activities of the 
mind which are neither directly triggered by physical 
stimuli nor expressed in bodily changes. Although, so 
far, negative potentials have been reported before some 
kinds of mental actions (i.e., imagining of movements), 
these actions were always stimulus driven (Beisteiner et 
al., 1995; Cunnington et al., 1996; Jankelowitz and Cole‑
batch, 2002). The only exception, wherein stimulus‑driv‑
en responses were not involved, was the seminal study 
by Libet et al. (1983) in which, while observing a spot of 
light revolving on an oscilloscope screen (for a HTML5 
open source version of the Libet’s clock see Garaizar et 
al., 2016), participants voluntarily initiated finger move‑
ments, and only later reported the clock position of the 
revolving spot. (That is, participants reported when they 
decided to initiate their actions.) Yet, these were manual, 
not mental actions. Furthermore, we needed an experi‑
ment with a freely initiated mental activity, but still in 
the presence of a stimulus to be later used for a reliable 
determination of the beginning of such mental action. 
To this end, we simplified the Libet clock to two 
time points (12 and 6 o’clock), as shown in Fig.1, and 
let participants decide at will on one of these two pos‑
sible points for action initiation. Then we asked them 
to report after 2.56 seconds what point on the clock’s 
face was actually selected for performance of the men‑
tal action, or control the imagined manual action. The 
beginnings of responses in the third condition, real 
manual actions, were recorded by button presses. Such 
a procedure allows the measure of starting points for 
both mental and physical actions. Using electroen‑
cephalography (EEG), we then investigated whether 
RPs can be also observed prior to purely mental volun‑
tary actions. Thus, in addition to preparation for actual 
finger movements – a kind of replication of a study by 
Kornhuber and Deecke (1965), or imagined index finger 
movements (cf. Jankelowitz and Colebatch, 2002), the 
key task was preparation for performance of a simple 
mental action (here: arithmetic calculation). 
Measuring the time course of preparatory activity 
occurring before a mental (or any) task is not possi‑
ble in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
studies (Soon et al., 2013). It merely enables a precise 
localization of their neural substrates. Specifically, one 
can only conclude that whereas the vague “when” of 
a mental act is correlated with the pre‑supplementary 
motor area (pre‑SMA) activity, the “what” (mental act) 
decision is linked to the medial prefrontal and parietal 
cortex activity. Similarly, when an EEG study on mental 
actions is focused on spatial attention (Bengson et al., 
2014), the occipital alpha‑band power (8‑13 Hz) merely 
allows to predict the location of attentional focus, rath‑
er than its timing. All in all, despite earlier attempts to 
investigate the neural processes preceding mental ac‑
tions, none of the previous studies have addressed the 
issue of their detailed temporal characteristics. 
In this report, we have adopted a standard motor 
paradigm to examine the temporal patterns and direc‑
tion of modulations in neural activity preceding purely 
mental actions, wherein participants perform the sum‑
mation of components of three‑digit numbers at a free‑
ly chosen time. As already indicated, the classic para‑
digm was modified to overcome the main challenge in 
such a task; identification of the exact moment when 
the mental activity starts. The purpose of our study 
was to investigate if any specific regularities in neu‑
ral activity could be observed in EEG signals preceding 
the initiation of purely mental actions. If the answer is 
“yes”, the next question is whether these EEG readings 
resemble RPs registered for typical motor acts?
In all three action kinds studied here, we found slow‑
ly increasing negative charges in the electrophysiolog‑
ical signals before the beginning of a particular task. 
These findings show that RPs occur prior to voluntary 
action execution regardless of its physical or mental na‑
ture. Such outcomes clearly demonstrate that previous 
reports have not recognized one of the most critical fea‑
tures of RPs. From a more general viewpoint, counter 
to common expectations that the brain needs time to 
set the body in motion, as opposed to setting the mind 
which can be done in an instant (almost immediately), 
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we discovered that preparations for both physical and 
mental acts take a similar time. We interpret this strik‑
ing result as an indication of a deeper regularity in neu‑
ral processing: the action – be it physical or mental – 
has to be preceded by brain activity of similar duration.
METHODS 
Participants 
Nineteen volunteers (10 women) aged 21 to 27 
(mean=23.4, SD=1.31) took part in this study. None 
had history of psychiatric or neurological illnesses. 
All participants declared right handedness. Yet, be‑
cause the dependent measure (i.e., readiness poten‑
tial) is hardly influenced by handedness (Brunia et al., 
1985), there was no need to verify hand preference by 
any objective measure. As our paradigm involved dots 
with changing colors, participants were tested with 
Ishihara Color Test (plates 3, 6, 12, 16, 18) to confirm 
that they were able to properly recognize the four 
colors used. Written informed consents were obtained 
from all participants prior to the study.
Study location and ethical approval
Our experiment was conducted in Action and 
Cognition Laboratory in the Institute of Psycholo‑
gy at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. The 
research project was approved by the local Ethics 
Committee for Research Involving Human Subjects, 
which reviewed the adopted ethical standards for 
participants’ recruitment, experimental protocols, 
and debriefing. As such, all procedures performed in 
our study were in accordance with the 1964 Helsinki 
declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards.
Experimental tasks 
All participants performed three blocks of tasks: 
mental additions of components of three digit num‑
bers, imagined movements of the right index finger (as 
if a keyboard button was pressed), and actual perfor‑
mances of the right index finger movements, name‑
ly real button presses. Each block of tasks was run in 
a random order assigned to study participants. In each 
condition, a simplified clock face with a spot rotating 
every 2.56 s was shown on a flat 19” (48.26‑cm) CRT 
screen with a refresh rate of 75 Hz, and positioned at 
a distance of 70 cm from participants’ eyes. The look 
of the clock was inspired by the one originally used 
by Libet (1983; 1985) and remained identical across 
conditions except for the colors of dots involved, and 
centrally presented three‑digit numbers necessary 
for mental addition. The simplified clocks used in this 
study are shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The simplified Libet clocks. Left panel: the clock with the spot revolving as in Libet (1983) experiment, with additional three‑digit numbers shown 
in the middle and changing every 1.28 s. Participants decided at will on one of the two possible points for action initiation, added the three numbers 
composing a given digit, and reported the outcome after 2.56 s, which also indicated what point on the clock’s face was actually selected for performance 
of the mental action. Middle panel: the clock with revolving spots which changed colors every 1.28  s. Participants’ task was to imagine index finger 
movements, again starting at will on one of the two possible points for action initiation. Right panel: the clock with the revolving black spot, whose top 
or bottom position was at will selected for real button presses. The three different clocks, associated with respective study conditions, were presented in 
separate blocks whose order was randomized for different participants.
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Because the beginnings of mental actions, due to 
a lack of associated overt behavior, cannot be deter‑
mined by objective measurements (with the problem 
becoming even more acute when actions must be per‑
formed voluntarily), the main challenge of this study 
was to overcome this limitation. To this end, we sim‑
plified the Libet clock leaving only two critical marks 
– vertical dashes – on the clock’s face. The first one 
was at the 12 and the other at the 6 o’clock position. 
Therefore, participants could freely choose the mo‑
ment of action initiation, whether physical or mental, 
from this limited range of options. It is of note that, 
in contrast to other experiments involving non‑overt 
actions (Beisteiner et al., 1995; Cunnington et al., 1996; 
Jankelowitz and Colebatch 2002), such restrictions did 
not deprive participants from their freedom of mak‑
ing choices, thus allowing them to retain some scope 
of volitionality. This way, the expected neural activ‑
ity would not be stimulus driven, as in the case of 
contingent negative variation (Walter et al., 1964) or 
stimulus preceding negativity (Brunia, 1988), the two 
potentials similar in shape to RP but associated with 
stimulus anticipation (Brunia et al., 2012). Notably, in 
mental calculations a hypothetical time span between 
a direct intention to act and the onset of mental action 
might be so short that it could be negligible. There‑
fore, the exact moment a person consciously starts to 
perform mental action would be reflected in neural ac‑
tivity changes that differ from the ones observed in 
classic RP.
Mental actions in the current study, as indicated 
above, involved summation of three digits forming 
a number. The stimuli were presented in the center of 
the simplified Libet clock, and the digits changed ran‑
domly every 1.28 s, each time when the rotating spot 
crossed the top or bottom dash of the clock face. The 
actual moment when the three digits were to be add‑
ed was voluntarily chosen, yet limited either to the 12 
or 6 o’clock position. Participants were asked to report 
the obtained sum exactly after the spot ran a full circle 
(i.e., after 2.56 s). Specifically, the task required from 
our participants to add the three digits in three digit 
numbers (e.g., 123, 504, 341). For example, for the num‑
ber 123 the answer would be (1+2+3 =) 6. The displayed 
numbers were selected in such a way that a sum of their 
digits ranged from 3 to 9, and none of the presented 
numbers included two zeros as its components.
Imagined right index finger movements were initi‑
ated when the color of the revolving spot changed ran‑
domly (into red, green, blue or yellow), yet again only 
when the spot reached either the top or bottom of the 
clock face. Specifically, in this condition, participants 
freely chose positions 12 or 6 (where the dots changed 
colors) as the starting point for imagined movements. 
As before, they were also asked to report the moment 
when they imagined the movement exactly after the 
spot ran a full circle (i.e., after 2.56 s). Notably, par‑
ticipants were requested to imagine that they kines‑
thetically move their fingers (from the first person’s 
perspective), rather than to imagine a movement of 
a finger (i.e., a displacement of an alien finger, or the 
third person’s perspective), because a first‑person/
subjective motor imagery of moving something can 
have a different neural substrate than a visual imagery 
of an external moving object (cf. Guillot et al., 2009). In 
order to make kinesthetic imagery easier, their right 
hands were covered with a scarf. 
The actual right index finger movements were also 
performed when the rotating spot reached either the 
top or bottom of the clock’s face. In short, partici‑
pants were instructed to press the keyboard space bar 
at a freely chosen moment, yet only when the spot 
reached either the 12 or 6 o’clock. 
Notably, participants were asked to avoid using any 
strategy in deciding the time of an action (e.g., to avoid 
starting their actions always when the spot reached 12 
o’clock) and to act with no hurry. Strategic timing of 
a response would be completely different from sponta‑
neous selection of one of the two possible time points 
for action, and as “stimulus driven” would not give rise 
to typical RP. Participants were acquainted with task 
rules twice: first with verbal instructions from an ex‑
perimenter, and then in the form of written instruc‑
tions. Additionally, to check the proper understanding 
of instructions, participants were requested to describe 
the tasks in their own words. 
The research paradigm was implemented in Super‑
Lab ver. 5 (Cedrus®, San Pedro, CA) and the study was 
carried out in a moderately lit room. The task blocks 
were performed until at least 80 trials from each partic‑
ipant were collected. The duration of a particular block 
ranged from 10 to 20 minutes.
Recording technique and pre‑processing
EEG data were acquired using sampling rate of 
2048 Hz with a 64‑channel BioSemi system with active 
electrodes. The electrode placement was in accordance 
with the 10/20 system (Jasper, 1958). The impedance 
was kept below 5 kΩ for all electrodes. Electro‑oculo‑
graphic activity, which was recorded from two pairs 
of electrodes positioned around the eyes (horizontal‑
ly near the outer corners of the left and right eye, as 
well as above and below the left eye), was used to fil‑
ter out signal artifacts related to eye movements and 
blinking. Signal processing and the visualization of 
brain activity was carried out with Brain Vision Ana‑
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lyzer 2.0. The obtained EEG recordings were re‑sampled 
to 150 Hz frequency, then filtered with low‑frequency 
cut‑off of 0.1 Hz, high‑frequency cut‑off of 30 Hz, and 
a notch filter of 50 Hz. In each condition the signal was 
subsequently divided into segments preceding task 
performance by 1,000 ms, with the baseline defined as 
the average activity from 300‑ms intervals prior to the 
1,000‑ms segments. For additional analyses, longer pe‑
riods of inactivity (i.e., time intervals within the blocks 
of tasks when participants decided not to undertake 
any actions) were also segmented into 1,000‑ms inter‑
vals prior to the dot passing either 12 or 6 o’clock, with 
the baseline again defined as the average activity from 
the 300‑ms window preceding such 1,000‑ms segments.
Data analyses  
In all participants whose data were included in the 
analyses, each individual trial was evaluated for cor‑
rectness (adherence to instructions). As a result, in 14 
participants an insignificant number of trials (~5%) 
with clear anticipations or delays (i.e., responses at 
least 300 ms prior to or after the rotating spot crossed 
the top or bottom dash of the clock face), with incor‑
rectly named colors of the dots, or incorrect summa‑
tions of the displayed digits, were excluded from anal‑
yses. All data obtained from five participants had to 
be excluded from analyses for the following reasons: 
errors during signal registration (one participant), and 
unintentional nonadherence or forgetting of instruc‑
tions which led to incorrect task performance (four 
participants, despite their in‑depth training). Notably, 
given the testing paradigm that was used here, the cor‑
rectness of performance could be assessed – based on 
audio‑video recordings – only after the completion of 
the experimental session.
As in previous studies dealing with RPs (Kornhu‑
ber and Deecke, 1965; Libet et al., 1983), the Cz elec‑
trode with the highest negative average signal in the 
1,000‑ms window prior to task performance was se‑
lected for the main analysis of the scalp‑recorded slow 
negative shifts in brain electric potentials, including 
negativity slopes. Yet, to be more consistent with cur‑
rent approaches, analogical signals were also extract‑
ed from six most active electrodes in this vicinity – Cz, 
FCz, C1, FC1, C2, and FC2 – regardless of study condition 
(i.e., electrode selection was based on brain activity av‑
eraged across all three conditions, and was therefore 
orthogonal to any potential differences between con‑
ditions of interest, e.g., Driel et al., 2012). While these 
results are also depicted in the main text, because they 
are virtually identical their detailed descriptions can 
be found in supplemental materials.
Although the beginning of RP can be loosely defined 
at this stage as a steady increase in negative potential 
relative to baseline (or comparable intervals of inac‑
tivity), its statistical significance can be further ascer‑
tained (Guthrie and Buchwald, 1991). Given specific 
parameters of the time interval of interest, number 
of participants, and autocorrelation parameter, seven 
successively significant point‑to‑point differences re‑
vealed by t‑tests (performed on the 150 data points ac‑
quired from resampling of the signal within each of the 
1000‑ms intervals) must be obtained to consider the 
signal change as significant. Between‑tasks compari‑
sons of RPs were also performed separately for each of 
the 150 time points to test whether or not the observed 
signal modulations were significantly different. 
To make comparisons between and within condi‑
tions easier, mean signal amplitude changes within 
three time intervals (starting from ‑900 to 0 ms) were 
also calculated and subjected to a 3 (condition: men‑
tal action, imagined finger movement, the actual fin‑
ger movement) by 3 (time interval: ‑900 to ‑600, ‑600 
to ‑300, and ‑300 to 0 ms) by 2 (task: action, inactivity) 
repeated‑measures analysis of variance (rmANOVA). 
Instead of an a priori 1,000‑ms window prior to task 
performance, the 900‑ms window, additionally divided 
into three equal time intervals, was selected because 
this is where real increases of activity were observed 
in our study. Interestingly, even Libet (1985, see also 
commentaries) argues that a short (300‑ms) interval of 
cerebral activity is needed to invoke the “neuronal ad‑
equacy” for conscious experience.
The obtained effect sizes are provided here as the 
proportion of variance accounted for, using partial eta 
squared [pη²]. For completeness, the observed power 
(OP) is also reported.
To investigate if any lateralization of the RP signal, 
corrected for the average signal from a corresponding 
time window with no activity, can be observed on the 
electrodes in the vicinity of Cz, two groups of elec‑
trodes (right: FC2, FC4, FC6, C2, C4, C6, CP2, CP4, CP6, 
and left: FC1, FC3, FC5, C1, C3, C5, CP1, CP3, CP5), and 
ten 100‑ms intervals were selected for further analyses. 
To calculate the contralateral‑ipsilateral difference be‑
tween potentials, the average signal from the right‑sid‑
ed electrodes was contrasted with the left‑sided elec‑
trodes for each of the ten time intervals. 
RESULTS 
The overall signal changes observed for mental 
actions were similar to the ones observed for imag‑
ined finger movements. Furthermore, even though 
the movements were imagined or performed with the 
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dominant hand, the readiness potential signals regis‑
tered on electrodes in the vicinity of Cz were barely 
lateralized to any of the hemispheres, except for some 
subtle effects observed in the very late phase of prepa‑
ratory activity for imagined finger movements. These 
results are illustrated in Fig. 2. Specifically, back‑av‑
eraging of EEG signals observed prior to performance 
of the three kinds of tasks showed clear‑cut affinities 
between the temporal and directional modulations of 
neural activity. In all three conditions – i.e., mental 
addition (the main task), as well as imagined, and ac‑
tual index finger movements (the two control tasks), 
wherein participants freely chose the moment the re‑
quired action was initiated – we observed the greatest 
changes of signal amplitude in the 1,000‑ms time win‑
dow on the Cz electrode placed over the vertex of the 
head (Jasper, 1958).
As shown in Fig. 3, through most of the time cours‑
es the readiness potentials observed in the three con‑
ditions did not differ significantly between each oth‑
er, except for a few time points. Specifically, pairwise 
comparisons for the 150 RP time points for the Cz 
electrode depicted in Fig. 3A revealed that the only in‑
terval wherein significant differences between condi‑
tions were observed was located between ‑833 ms and 
‑773 ms (i.e., ten consecutive time points), but it was 
Fig. 2. Average changes of signal amplitudes for the three tested conditions. In the case of mental addition (upper row) and imagined movement (middle 
row) similar distributions of signal changes over central areas were observed. Notably, in the latter case, the signal seemed more lateralized to left 
hemisphere in the late phase. In the case of the index finger movement (lower row) the potential seemed to be lateralized to the left hemisphere in the 
late preparatory phase. Yet, the differences between the left and right hemisphere were not significant.
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limited only to a direct comparison of mental action 
and imagined finger movement. No further significant 
differences between conditions were observed (with 
the provision that at least seven consecutive compar‑
isons must be significant). As shown in Fig. 3B, the 
same results were obtained when relevant signals in 
this vicinity were extracted from the six most active 
electrodes for each of the studied conditions.
The characteristic shape of signal amplitude en‑
velope, typically linked to readiness potential asso‑
ciated with physical body movements, was found in 
each of the studied tasks. Fig. 4A‑C shows these ef‑
fects with reference to control intervals of inactivity. 
During mental calculation (digit addition), as shown 
in Fig. 4A (top panel), the beginning of readiness po‑
tential was observed as early as 907 ms before task 
Fig. 3. Average traces for action‑related potentials (readiness potentials, RPs) registered in each of the three studied conditions. (A) RPs extracted for each 
study condition with the use of the Cz electrode (as in all classic studies on related reports). (B) RPs extracted for each condition with the signal averaged 
across six most active electrodes. 0 on the X axis indicates the moment of action execution. Prior to this point, before 500 ms, clear convergence of all 
three potentials is observed, regardless of the signal extraction method.
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performance. All t‑tests between individual data 
samples contrasted with baseline (‑1,300 to ‑1,000 ms 
before action initiation), with at least seven consec‑
utive significant point‑to‑point differences required 
to be meaningful (Guthrie and Buchwald, 1991), start‑
ing from this time point were significant (at 907 ms, 
t13=‑2.330, P<0.05). Indeed, exactly the same time 
point was revealed as the beginning of this slow shift 
in negative potential when we compared mental ac‑
tion to control time intervals of inactivity from this 
task block. The observed gradient of RP change was 6 
μV/s (r=0.918). 
When, instead of a point by point analysis of RPs, the 
signal was collapsed across three equal time intervals 
(starting from ‑900 to 0 ms), the outcomes were very 
similar. As shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 4A, with 
mean signal amplitude changes averaged separately for 
each of the three time intervals, significant signal in‑
creases as compared to corresponding intervals of in‑
activity were found in each of the tested intervals. This 
effect was, in fact, found regardless of the study condi‑
tion, as revealed by a significant time by task interac‑
tion from the rmANOVA (described in the Methods sec‑
tion), F1.101,14.310=20.88, P<0.001, pη²=0.616, and OP=0.992 
(with Greenhouse‑Geisser corrected degrees of free‑
dom). The effect was such that increases of RP‑related 
activity in the first time interval, as compared to the 
remaining two intervals, were small but still significant 
(with Bonferroni‑corrected P [BFp]=0.008). All the re‑
sults from the omnibus rmANOVA are described in Sup‑
plemental Materials.
There was no evidence for the lateralization of 
signal in this condition. Specifically, in the immedi‑
ate vicinity of the Cz site, no significant differences 
were observed for any of the 100‑ms windows in the 
contralateral‑ipsilateral comparisons of the selected 
electrodes.
As shown in Fig. 4B (top panel), a comparison be‑
tween RP preceding imagined finger movement and 
control time intervals indicated that, despite signal 
increases above baseline which started at 787 ms be‑
fore movement onset (t13=‑4.06, P=0.001), a significant 
signal modulation in this condition started 687 ms (as 
compared to periods of inactivity) before this action 
was performed (t13=‑2.155, P=0.05). From then on, the 
observed increases in negative signal were significant 
(except for few time points), and the observed gradient 
of RP change was 9.4 μV/s (r=0.96). As the bottom panel 
of Fig. 4B shows, but somewhat counter to the effect 
indicated above (see a description of the bottom panel 
of Fig. 4A), significant RP signal increases (vs. intervals 
of inactivity) were found in the second and third time 
intervals (if a separate rmANOVA was performed for 
this condition) only.
Interestingly, only in this condition the contralat‑
eral‑ipsilateral comparison of the selected electrodes 
revealed significant differences in the last two of the 
100‑ms windows (namely between 200 and 0 ms pri‑
or to imagined finger onset: from ‑200 ms to ‑ 100 ms, 
t13=‑2.191, P<0.05, and from ‑100 ms to action execution 
t13=‑2.563, P<0.05). Yet, these differences would not sur‑
vive the Bonferroni correction.
Finally, as shown in the top panel of Fig. 4C, a com‑
parison between RP preceding actual finger move‑
ments and control time intervals indicated that, de‑
spite signal increases which started 847 ms before 
movement onset (t13=‑2.91, P<0.05, as compared to 
baseline), several points of significant signal modula‑
tion in this condition (as compared to periods of inac‑
tivity) were observed only as late as 727 ms before this 
action was performed (t13=‑2.299, P<0.05). Yet, the ob‑
served increases in negative signal were not continu‑
ously significant (until ‑367 ms, t13=‑2.395, P<0.05). The 
observed gradient of RP change was 5.8 μV/s (r=0.977). 
Consistent with the weaker initial increases of RP in 
the point by point analysis, with signals collapsed 
within the three time intervals, and as the bottom pan‑
el of Fig. 4C shows, there would be significant signal 
increases only in the second and third time interval (if 
a separate rmANOVA for this particular condition was 
performed).
As before, we did not find any evidence for the lat‑
eralization of RP signal in this condition. In the imme‑
diate vicinity of the Cz site, similarly to mental action, 
no significant difference between the selected elec‑
trodes was observed for any of the 100‑ms windows in 
the contralateral‑ipsilateral comparison.
Virtually identical results were obtained when the 
signals were extracted from the six most active elec‑
trodes in this vicinity, including the Cz electrode. These 
effects are shown in Fig. 4D‑F, and described in more 
detail in the supplemental materials.
It is also worthy to directly compare a depiction of 
the time points in Fig. 4A, 4B and 4C (see also Fig. 3, 
where RPs in the three conditions are shown only vs. 
baseline), that is, with respect to each other. One could 
in fact argue that mental actions are more engaging and 
start differing from inactivity intervals even earlier. 
Yet, inactivity‑related reference signals seem to differ 
among the three blocks and therefore, such differences 
should be interpreted with caution. Conversely, an ex‑
amination of signal changes following the beginnings 
of actions (i.e., after their execution) would immedi‑
ately reveal long‑lasting significant signal differences. 
Yet, because they are no longer related to preparatory 
processes taking place exclusively “in the head”, and 
are no doubt related to differences in action modes, 
they will not be considered here.
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Fig. 4. Preparatory activity for the voluntary performance of the three tasks contrasted with respective periods of inactivity. (A‑C) Readiness potentials 
(RPs) extracted from the Cz electrode. (A) Mental action (arithmetic). (B) Imagined finger movement. (C) The actual index finger movement. (D‑F) RPs 
for the three tasks, extracted from the six most active electrodes, regardless of the study condition. Top panels: 150 RP time points for each condition. 
Bottom panels: RP changes collapsed across three equal time intervals (starting from ‑900 to 0 ms). In all panels, 0 on the X axis reflects the moment 
of action execution.
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DISCUSSION
While it seems indisputable that the brain needs pro‑
cessing time during preparation for physical actions, 
whether or not getting ready for mental actions also re‑
quires any time is a question for debate. The results of 
this study clearly show that there is no difference in the 
temporal and directional patterns of intention‑related 
neural activity, i.e., regardless of whether signals record‑
ed before the volitional initiation of purely mental acts, 
imagined bodily movements, or physical motor responses 
are concerned. The characteristic, slowly increasing neg‑
ative potentials starting around one second prior to any 
of these self‑initiated actions, with the strongest effect 
observed on an electrode with the highest negative values 
of their amplitudes, indicate that the same electrophysio‑
logical readiness potential (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; 
Jankelowitz and Colebatch, 2002; Shibasaki and Hallett, 
2006) precedes mental operations (here: digit addition). 
If motor and mental activity is led by processes or mech‑
anisms of the same kind, the resulting conclusion is such 
that the human brain initiates any actions in the same 
way, regardless of their physical or mental nature. 
The potentials registered in the three different con‑
ditions studied here did not differ significantly through 
most of their time courses, even though some divergence 
between them was expected as a result of putative differ‑
ential contribution from supplementary and premotor 
cortical regions. For example, the initiation of intentional 
movement is typically headed by pre‑SMA and SMA activ‑
ity in the early preparatory phase, and then accompanied 
by more posterior dorsal premotor involvement (Praams‑
tra et al., 1995; Erdler et al., 2000; Cunnington et al., 2002; 
Fried et al., 2011; Makoshi et al., 2011). For the latest phase 
of purely mental actions we expected to see a decrease in 
RP in this particular vicinity, since these motor regions 
should not be engaged in their preparation. To our sur‑
prise, no change in the RP profile was detected. While our 
experiment does not disentangle the exact source of the 
observed similarities in brain processes preceding actions 
of such different kinds, a few critical questions emerge. Is 
it a single mechanism that is common to both mental and 
physical actions? Alternatively, are there two (or more) 
different brain mechanisms that develop in a similar way 
in their temporal domains? Given the obtained results, 
there must be one common mechanism which is respon‑
sible for selection and initiation of the appropriate cogni‑
tive or motor system which will subsequently execute the 
selected task. If this is the case then the standard concept 
of RP – previously described as a potential preceding only 
the motor activity (Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006) – requires 
in fact an extension to all kinds of intentional actions. 
All things considered, RP can be regarded as a general 
phenomenon that occurs before execution of volitional 
action independently of its bodily or mental character, 
and independent of cognitive attitudes (Kornhuber and 
Deecke, 1965; Taylor, 1978; Slobounov et al., 2004).
From this perspective, Libet’s experiment (1983, 
1985), and particularly the concept of an intention to 
move a body part requires some reinterpretation too. 
Regardless of the compulsory initial brain activity, that 
is RP which always precedes a physical action, an “inten‑
tion to move” – that in Libet’s experiment was reported 
to occur about 200 ms prior to movement onset – can‑
not be considered a purely mental act. Thus, the failed 
attempts to find separate or additional RPs that should 
occur before such a conscious decision (i.e., an inten‑
tion) to physically start a movement (Libet, 1985) are 
not that surprising. Yet, based on the flawed reasoning 
that “intention” is “a typical example of mental action”, 
RPs should not occur prior to mental actions. The results 
of our experiment indicate otherwise, but also call for 
a clarification of a concept of mental action. 
Although mental actions may not necessarily require 
effort, many of them do. This is definitely the case for 
mental calculations but not necessarily for a simple “in‑
tention to move” – a prerequisite of any voluntary motor 
activity. Unlike the latter, such effortful mental operations 
that lead to a specific outcome, even though still mental, 
must be also preceded by RPs. In sharp contrast, a simple 
intention to move is not in our view that different from, 
or is even equivalent to, a simple command (e.g., “Move 
a finger now!”) and is apparently issued without RP. 
The temporal characteristics of signal changes ob‑
served prior to mental addition, that is increases in 
negative potentials which are indistinguishable from 
RPs observed before motor acts, suggest a common un‑
derlying neural mechanism. This may also indicate that 
elementary arithmetic operations, such as addition, 
are less abstract than usually assumed. If this were the 
case then mental summation of digits would be a kind 
of embodied action, even though not linked to any 
overt movement. A support for this view comes from 
evidence that mathematical abilities and finger repre‑
sentations have overlapping neural substrates (Andres 
et al., 2007, 2012; Penner‑Wilger and Anderson, 2013). 
Yet, these common underpinnings are typically locat‑
ed in the inferior parietal lobule, as in Gerstmann’s 
syndrome linked to damage to the angular gyrus. On 
the other hand, there is clear behavioral evidence that 
finger movements interfere with mathematical abil‑
ities (Michaux et al., 2013). Indeed, unskilled finger 
counting takes much longer than mental operations on 
numbers. Therefore, even if the latter are mediated by 
processes taking place in brain areas responsible for 
movement control, it does not simply entail that arith‑
metic calculations are of motoric nature (Klichowski 
and Króliczak, 2017).
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CONCLUSION
The observation that the cerebral cortex needs around 
one second to be ready for a mental effort shows that for‑
mer intuitions about activities of the mind (and brain) 
clearly require some revisions. In a common view, switching 
from a particular mental action to another one differs from 
switching between different actions of the body. Therefore, 
it is natural to expect that a new kind of movement, which 
is not a continuation of a previous one, cannot be initiated 
at an instant. Yet, we do believe and commonly experience 
that a new kind of mental effort is not preceded by a time 
gap. The results of this study convincingly show that such 
a universal mental experience is a misleading one.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
All data will be shared upon request. Some of the 
equipment used for data acquisition and analyses was 
funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education 
grant 6168/IA/128/2012 to GK. We would like to thank 
Brian J. Piper for his comments on this work and report.
Author contributions: M.R., A.K., and G.K. designed the 
study; M.R. and A.N. ran the experiment, M.R. and A.N. an‑
alyzed the data, M.R., A.N., A.K., and G.K. wrote the paper.
REFERENCES
Alexander P, Schlegel A, Sinnott‑Armstrong  W, Roskies AL, Wheatley T, 
Tse  PU (2016) Readiness potentials driven by non‑motoric processes. 
Conscious Cogn 39: 38–47.
Andres  M, Michaux N, Pesenti  M (2012) Common substrate for mental 
arithmetic and finger representation in the parietal cortex. NeuroImage 
62: 1520–1528.
Andres M, Seron X, Olivier E (2007) Contribution of hand motor circuits to 
counting. J Cogn Neurosci 19: 563–576.
Beisteiner R, Höllinger P, Lindinger G, Lang W, Berthoz A (1995) Mental rep‑
resentations of movements. Brain potentials associated with imagination 
of hand movements. Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol 96: 183–193.
Bengson JJ, Kelley TA, Zhang X, Wang J‑L, Mangun GR (2014) Spontaneous neu‑
ral fluctuations predict decisions to attend. J Cogn Neurosci 26: 2578–2584.
Brass M, Lynn MT, Demanet J, Rigoni D (2013) Imaging volition: what the 
brain can tell us about the will. Exp Brain Res 229: 301–312.
Brunia CH, van Boxtel GJ, Böcker KB (2012) Negative slow waves as indices 
of anticipation: The Bereitschaftspotential, the contingent negative vari‑
ation, and the stimulus‑preceding negativity. In: The Oxford Handbook 
of Event‑Related Potential Components (Luck SJ, Kappenman ES, Eds.). 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, p. 189–207. 
Brunia CH, Voorn FJ, Berger MP (1985) Movement related slow potentials. 
II. A contrast between finger and foot movements in left‑handed sub‑
jects. Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol 60: 135–145.
Brunia CHM (1988) Movement and stimulus preceding negativity. Biol Psy‑
chol 26: 165–178.
Cunnington R, Iansek R, Bradshaw JL, Phillips JG (1996) Movement‑related 
potentials associated with movement preparation and motor imagery. 
Exp Brain Res 111: 429–436.
Cunnington R, Windischberger C, Deecke L, Moser E (2002) The prepara‑
tion and execution of self‑initiated and externally‑triggered movement: 
a study of event‑related fMRI. NeuroImage 15: 373–385.
Deecke L, Scheid P, Kornhuber H (1969) Distribution of readiness potential, 
pre‑motion positivity, and motor potential of the human cerebral cortex 
preceding voluntary finger movements. Exp Brain Res 7: 158–168.
Driel J van, Ridderinkhof KR, Cohen MX (2012) Not all errors are alike: Theta 
and Alpha EEG dynamics relate to differences in error‑processing dy‑
namics. J Neurosci 32: 16795–16806.
Erdler  M, Beisteiner R, Mayer D, Kaindl T, Edward  V, Windischberger C, 
Lindinger G, Deecke L (2000) Supplementary motor area activation pre‑
ceding voluntary movement is detectable with a whole‑scalp magneto‑
encephalography system. NeuroImage 11: 697–707.
Fried I, Mukamel R, Kreiman G (2011) Internally generated preactivation of 
single neurons in human medial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron 
69: 548–562.
Garaizar P, Cubillas CP, Matute H (2016) A HTML5 open source tool to con‑
duct studies based on Libet’s clock paradigm. Sci Rep 6: 32689.
Guillot A, Collet C, Nguyen VA, Malouin F, Richards C, Doyon J (2009) Brain 
activity during visual versus kinesthetic imagery: An fMRI study. Hum 
Brain Mapp 30: 2157–2172.
Guthrie D, Buchwald JS (1991) Significance testing of difference potentials. 
Psychophysiology 28: 240–244.
Jankelowitz SK, Colebatch JG (2002) Movement‑related potentials associat‑
ed with self‑paced, cued and imagined arm movements. Exp Brain Res 
147: 98–107.
Jasper MH (1958) The ten‑twenty electrode system of the international fed‑
eration. Clin Neurophysiol 10: 371–375.
Jo HG, Wittmann M, Hinterberger T, Schmidt S (2014) The readiness poten‑
tial reflects intentional binding. Front Hum Neurosci 8: 421.
Klichowski  M, Króliczak G (2017) Numbers and functional lateralization: 
A  visual half‑field and dichotic listening study in proficient bilinguals. 
Neuropsychologia 100: 93–109.
Kornhuber HH, Deecke L (1965) Brain potential changes in voluntary and pas‑
sive movements in humans: readiness potential and reafferent potentials 
(in Deutsch). Pflüg Arch Für Gesamte Physiol Menschen Tiere 284: 1–17.
Lang W (2003) Surface recordings of the Bereitschaftspotential in normals. 
In: The Bereitschaftspotential (Jahanshahi M, Hallett M, Eds.). Springer 
US, p. 19–34. 
Libet B (1985) Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will 
in voluntary action. Behav Brain Sci 8: 529–566.
Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK (1983) Time of conscious intention 
to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness‑potential). The un‑
conscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain J Neurol 106: 623–642.
Makoshi Z, Kroliczak G, Donkelaar P van (2011) Human supplementary motor 
area contribution to predictive motor planning. J Mot Behav 43: 303–309.
Michaux N, Masson N, Pesenti M, Andres M (2013) Selective interference of 
finger movements on basic addition and subtraction problem solving. 
Exp Psychol 60: 197–205.
Penner‑Wilger M, Anderson ML (2013) The relation between finger gnosis 
and mathematical ability: why redeployment of neural circuits best ex‑
plains the finding. Theor Philos Psychol 4: 877.
Praamstra P, Stegeman DF, Horstink MW, Brunia CH, Cools AR (1995) 
Movement‑related potentials preceding voluntary movement are mod‑
ulated by the mode of movement selection. Exp Brain Res 103: 429–439.
Shibasaki H, Hallett M (2006) What is the Bereitschaftspotential? Clin Neu‑
rophysiol 117: 2341–2356.
Slobounov S, Hallett M, Newell KM (2004) Perceived effort in force produc‑
tion as reflected in motor‑related cortical potentials. Clin Neurophysiol 
115: 2391–2402.
Soon CS, He AH, Bode S, Haynes JD (2013) Predicting free choices for ab‑
stract intentions. Proc Natl Acad Sci 110: 6217–6222.
Taylor MJ (1978) Bereitschaftspotential during the acquisition of a skilled 
motor task. Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol 45: 568–576.
Readiness potential for mental actions 397Acta Neurobiol Exp 2019, 79: 386–398
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
The outcomes for the pooled signal from the six 
most active electrodes
For the electrodes with the highest activity – re‑
corded in the vicinity of, but also including, the Cz 
electrode – pairwise comparisons between mental ac‑
tions and imagined finger movements revealed some 
significant differences located between ‑827 ms and 
‑780 ms (i.e., in eight consecutive time points). In the 
case of real and imagined movements, the potentials 
preceding them were significantly different only be‑
tween ‑113 and ‑73 ms (i.e., for seven consecutive but 
late time points). The RPs related to these three condi‑
tions are shown in Fig. 3B.
Similarly to between‑condition comparisons, the 
comparisons within conditions vs. respective control 
intervals of inactivity do not differ much from the 
main, Cz‑limited analysis, either. In the case of mental 
actions, the RP started at 853 ms before action initi‑
ation (t13=‑2.223, P<0.05), and almost all further time 
points were significantly different from inactivity‑re‑
lated signal (except for time points between ‑420 ms 
and ‑413 ms, where p‑values were slightly above the 
0.05 threshold). For imagined finger movements the 
RP was significantly different from ‑533 ms (t13=‑2.227, 
P<0.05) to the very moment of action execution. Finally, 
in the case of the actual finger movements only sever‑
al points of significant signal modulations (vs. respec‑
tive inactivity points) were observed, and they started 
to occur as late as 720 ms before action performance 
(t13=‑2.380, P<0.05). For the visualization of these re‑
sults, see top panels of Fig. 4D‑F in the main text.
The outcomes of rmANOVA for the three time 
intervals immediately preceding action execution
The results for the Cz electrode alone
When mean signal amplitude changes within three 
time intervals (starting from ‑900 to 0 ms) were calcu‑
lated, and subjected to a 3 (condition: mental action, 
imagined finger movement, the actual finger move‑
ment) by 3 (time interval: ‑900 to ‑600, ‑600 to ‑300, 
and ‑300 to 0 ms) by 2 (task: action, inactivity) repeat‑
ed‑measures analysis of variance (rmANOVA), the fol‑
lowing results emerged. There was a main effect of time 
interval (F1.016,13.205=14.349, p<0.01, partial eta squared 
[pη2]=0.525, the observed power [OP]=0.94), such that 
regardless of the study condition and task, the pooled 
signals within each of the time intervals differed sig‑
nificantly from each other (with Bonferroni‑correct‑
ed p value [BFp]=at least 0.012). Moreover, there was 
a significant main effect of task (F1,13=26.658, p<0.001, 
pη2=0.672, OP=0.997) and it was such that regardless 
of the condition and time interval, the RP associated 
with action preparation was significantly different 
from inactivity‑related signal. There was also a signif‑
icant time interval by task interaction (F1.101,14.310=20.88, 
P<0.001, pη2=0.616, OP=0.992) and, as already mentioned 
in the main text, this effect was such that increases of 
RP‑related activity in the first time interval, as com‑
pared to the remaining two intervals, were the smallest 
but still significant (BFp=0.008).
Finally, there was also a significant condition by time 
interval interaction (F2.272,29.536=6.252, P<0.01, pη2=0.325, 
OP=0.89), and it indicated that the consecutive be‑
tween‑interval signal changes did not significantly dif‑
fer from each other for the mental actions (BFp≥0.08), 
they did significantly differ from each other for imag‑
ined finger movements (BFp<at least 0.006), whereas 
for actual finger movements the outcomes were quite 
similar to the former with the exception that there was 
only a trend towards a significant signal increase be‑
tween the second and third time interval (BFp=0.06). 
There were no further significant effects (neither the 
main effect of condition nor any remaining interaction, 
F≤1.228).
The results for the six most active electrodes  
(including the Cz electrode)
When mean signal amplitude changes within the 
three time intervals (‑900 to ‑600, ‑600 to ‑300, and 
‑300 to 0 ms) were calculated, and subjected to a 3 
(conditions) by 3 (time intervals) by 2 (tasks) rmANO‑
VA, the outcomes were the following. As for the Cz 
electrode alone, there was a main effect of time in‑
terval (F1.026,13.332=11.994, p<0.01, pη2=0.480, OP=0.898), 
such that regardless of the study condition and task, 
Walter WG, Cooper R, Aldridge VJ, Mccallum WC, Winter AL (1964) Contin‑
gent negative variation: an electric sign of sensorimotor association and 
expectancy in the human brain. Nature 203: 380–384.
Wen W, Minohara R, Hamasaki S, Maeda T, An Q, Tamura Y, Yamakawa H, 
Yamashita A, Asama H (2018) The readiness potential reflects the reli‑
ability of action consequence. Sci Rep 8: 11865.
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the signals within each of the time intervals differed 
significantly from each other (BFp=at least 0.024). As 
before, there was also a significant main effect of task 
(F1,13=22.601, p<0.001, pη2=0.635, OP=0.992) and it was 
such that regardless of the condition and time inter‑
val, the action‑related RP was significantly different 
from inactivity‑related signal. Similarly to Cz alone, 
there was also a significant time interval by task inter‑
action (F1.114,14.477=19.703, P<0.001, pη2=0.602, OP=0.990) 
and this effect, again, was such that increases of RP‑re‑
lated activity in the first time interval, vs.the remain‑
ing two intervals, were the smallest but still signifi‑
cant (BFp=0.015). Finally, there was also a significant 
condition by time interval interaction (F2.26,29.395=5.684, 
P<0.01, pη2=0.304, OP=0.856), and, as before, the consec‑
utive between‑interval signal changes did not signifi‑
cantly differ from each other for the mental actions 
(BFp≥0.127), but they did significantly differ from each 
other for imagined finger movements (BFp<at least 
0.012), whereas for actual finger movements the same 
exception emerged ‑ a trend towards a significant dif‑
ference between the second and third time interval 
(BFp=0.082). Similar to the classic analysis on the Cz 
electrode, there were no further significant effects 
(neither the main effect of condition nor any remain‑
ing interaction, F≤1.152).
